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the Idaho police

stop a driver reason-

V V

driving
under the
ably suspected
of
influence of alcohol
or drugs (DUI), Idaho's "implied
consent" law authorizes them to
have the driver's blood drawn (typically at a hospital) for testing.' Idaho
case law lets these blood draws occur without the warrants that the
Fourth Amendment usually requires
2
for such "search[es]" of "person[s]
The Idaho case law holds that these
blood draws may occur without
warrants because the blood draws
invariably fall within the warrant exceptions for "exigent circumstances"
and "consent searches"
This article explains that neither
exception validates all warrantless
blood draws under Idaho's implied
consent law. In Missouri v. McNeely,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently
overruled Idaho case law holding
that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood, per se, establishes
exigent circumstances.3 And U.S.
Supreme Court case law on consent
searches undermines the Idaho case
law upholding warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws under an "implied consent" theory.

assumes our Idaho police officer decides on a blood draw.
Before testing, Idaho's implied
consent law requires the officer to
give the driver information. The
driver learns: By driving on Idaho's roads, she is "deemed to have
given . . . consent" to testing for
alcohol or drugs if there are reasonable grounds to believe she is
driving under the influence of one
or both.4 If she refuses to take the
test or doesn't complete it, she may
be fined $250 and have her license
suspended for at least one year; she
can avoid those penalties only if she
shows good cause at a court hearing.' If- instead of refusing to take
Idaho's implied consent
or
not completing the test - she
law and related case law
takes the test and fails it, her license
You can understand Idaho's im- will be suspended for at least 90
plied consent law by envisioning the days, unless she shows good cause
typical situation in which an Idaho at an administrative hearing before
police officer pulls over a driver rea- the Department of Transportation.
sonably suspected of DUI. First, the Having heard this advice, the driver
officer observes the driver for signs decides whether or not to take the
of DUI, including the driver's per- blood test.
formance of field sobriety tests like
Readers will notice that the
standing on one leg. The officer may driver who refuses to submit to a
then decide to have the driver tested blood test faces stiffer administrawith a breathalyzer or a blood draw. tive penalties - a $250 civil fine
To focus on the situation presented and a driver's license suspension of
in Missouri v. McNeely, this article at least one year - than the driver
54
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U.S. Supreme Court case law on
consent searches undermines the
Idaho case law upholding
warrantless, nonconsensual
blood draws under an
"implied consent" theory.

who takes the test and fails it, who
faces no civil penalty and may suffer
an administrative suspension that
can be as short as 90 days. The stiffer
administrative penalties for refusal
to submit to a test reflect the legislature's intent "to discourage and
civilly penalize such a refusal." The
legislature wants drivers suspected
of DUI to submit to blood tests so
that, if they are in fact DUI, the tests
yield objective evidence to prosecute
them.

By administratively penalizing
the refusal to submit to a blood test,
Idaho's implied consent law does
not create a statutory right of refusal. 8 Indeed, once a driver has - by
operation of the law - impliedly
consented to a blood test by using
Idaho's roads, the driver cannot revoke that consent by refusing to
submit to the test if the police have
reasonable grounds to believe the
driver is DUI. 9 Thus, if the driver refuses to submit to a blood test, the
police can subject the driver to what
is commonly called a "forced" blood
draw.10
The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that the police do not need
a warrant for a forced blood draw.
The court has held that forced blood
draws fall within either of two exceptions to the warrant requirement.
First, the court held in State v.
Woolery that forced blood draws fall
within the exigent circumstances exception. The Woolery court reasoned
that "the destruction of the evidence
by metabolism of alcohol in the
blood provides an inherent exigency which justifies the warrantless
search"" This "inherent exigency"
theory treats the metabolization of
blood as enough, standing alone, to
establish exigent circumstances.
Second, the court held in State
v. Diaz that forced blood draws are
valid as consent searches. The Diaz
court recognized that the "forced"
drawing of Benito Diaz's blood was
"involuntary', because it occurred
12
despite his "continued ...protest."
Still, the blood draw qualified as a
consensual search because the police
had reasonable grounds to believe
that Mr. Diaz was DUI. In that situation, Mr. Diaz "had already given his
implied consent" to the blood draw
"by driving on an Idaho road" 3 According to the court, his protests immediately before the forced blood
draw did not revoke his prior (implied) consent, because under Idaho

precedent he had no right to revoke per se exigency that justifies an ex14
that consent.
ception to the Fourth Amendment's
Thus, Idaho case law uses a belt- warrant requirement for nonconand-suspenders approach to reject sensual blood testing in all drunkFourth Amendment challenges to driving cases " 5 Instead, courts must
forced, warrantless blood draws use a "totality of the circumstances"
from drivers reasonably suspected approach to determine exigent cirof DUI: The metabolization of alco- cumstances. The natural dissipation
hol in the blood, per se, establishes of alcohol in blood is just one cirexigent circumstances; alternatively, cumstance, and it must be considforced blood draws occur with the ered with other factors, such as the
statutorily implied consent of the ease and speed with which the podriver, and are thus sustainable as lice could get a warrant in the parconsent searches, even when the ticular case. 6
driver actually refuses to submit to
McNeely rejects the state-court
the test.
decisions that upheld warrantless
As discussed next, the U.S. Su- blood draws under the "per se exipreme Court's decision in McNeely gency" theory. Among the rejected
v. Missouri makes clear that the exi- state-court cases that the McNeely
gent circumstances belt is not large Court cited was the Idaho Supreme
enough to uphold all forced, war- Court's decision in Woolery.'7 Berantless blood draws. And when the cause of McNeely's rejection of the
exigent circumstances belt does not per se exigency theory, the exigent
fit, the implied consent suspend- circumstances exception cannot
ers snap under the pressure of U.S. justify all warrantless, forced blood
Supreme Court precedent on con- draws authorized by Idaho's implied
sent searches. Metaphors and case consent law. The question thus arislaw aside, warrantless, forced blood es: Can the warrantless, forced blood
draws violate the Fourth Amend- draws that aren't justified by exigent
ment in the absence of exigent cir- circumstances be justified, instead,
by the implied-consent theory upon
cumstances.
which the Idaho Supreme Court relied in Diaz?
McNeely v.Missouri'srejection of the
McNeely does not directly address
per se exigent circumstances theory
that question. Justice Sotomayor
The U.S. Supreme Court held in did, however, address implied conMissouri v. McNeely that "the natu- sent laws in a portion of her McNeely
ral metabolization of alcohol in the opinion that did not have the supbloodstream" does not "presen[t] a port of the majority of the Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McNeely v.Missouri makes clear
that the exigent circumstances belt is not large enough to
uphold all forced, warrantless blood draws.
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She wrote that implied consent laws
provide an effective alternative to
warrantless, nonconsensual blood
draws:
States have a broad range of legal
tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC [Blood
Alcohol Content] evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 states have adopted
implied consent laws that require
motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the
State, to consent to BAC testing
if they are arrested or otherwise
detained on suspicion of a drunkdriving offense. Such laws impose
significant consequences when
a motorist withdraws consent;
typically the motorist's driver's
license is immediately suspended
or revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take
a BAC test to be used as evidence
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.18
This statement clearly suggests
that a state may encourage drivers
to consent to blood draws by penalizing their refusal to consent. On
the other hand, it does not address
whether, if the driver refuses to give
actual consent, the state can rely on
their implied consent to justify a
forced blood draw. The next section
argues the answer is no.
The invalidity of the irrevocableimplied-consent theory
As discussed above, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Diaz held that a
warrantless, forced blood draw is
a valid consent search. This author
respectfully suggests that Diaz conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court case
law holding that consent to a search
must be voluntary and that the
scope of consent can be restricted.
This case law implies that consent,
once given, can be revoked. Implied
consent under Idaho's implied con56
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sent law, however, is neither voluntary nor revocable. It therefore cannot justify warrantless, forced blood
draws.
The leading U.S. Supreme Court
case on consent searches is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.19 There, the Court
upheld the police's warrantless
search of Robert Bustamonte's car
because he consented to the search.
His consent was valid because it was
voluntary. The Court explained that
voluntariness is judged under the
"totality of the circumstances' and
that consent is not voluntary if it is
"the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied 20
Implied consent under Idaho's
implied consent law is not voluntary. Its involuntariness becomes
clear if you imagine an Idaho official telling an Idaho resident applying for an Idaho driver's license:
"To drive on Idaho's roads, you must
consent to having your blood tested
if the police stop you with reasonable grounds to believe you are DUI.
Do you consent?" How many Idaho
residents would say no, if they knew

Implied consent under Idaho's
implied consent law, however,
is neither voluntary nor
revocable. It therefore cannot
justify warrantless, forced
blood draws.

that doing so would bar them from
driving in Idaho? For most Idaho
residents, driving in Idaho is a daily
necessity. The implied consent law
makes them an offer they can't refuse. In turn, their acceptance of that
offer is not voluntary.
But even if a driver's initial consent were voluntary, it would not

justify a forced blood draw when the
driver later refuses to submit to it.
Just as a person can restrictthe scope
of his or her consent to a search,2 a
person should be able to revoke consent previously given.2 2 In a sense,
voluntariness and revocability go
together. The Idaho Supreme Court
unwittingly proved this point when
it used the implied-consent theory
in Diaz to uphold what the Court itself characterized as an "involuntary"
blood draw. A consensual, "involuntary" blood draw is an oxymoron.
In sum, a warrantless, forced
blood draw from a driver suspected
of DUI satisfies the Fourth Amendment if exigent circumstances exist
in the particular case. But if they do
not, the irrevocable-implied-consent
theory cannot provide an alternative
justification.

In McNeely, the Court refused to rule that the metabolization of alcohol,
per se, establishes exigent circumstances, because the per se approach
conflicted with the totality of circumstances analysis used to analyze
exigent circumstances.
IL_11M Z M

Furthermore, many drivers would
rather have their licenses administratively suspended for a year (and
pay a fine) than submit to a test that
ensures their conviction for criminal
DUI.
Even so, this author suspects the
Court would not rely on a consent
theory to uphold the administrative
penalty schemes in implied consent
The permissibility of administratively
laws like Idaho's. That is because
penalizing drivers who refuse to
voluntariness analysis, like exigentsubmit to blood tests
circumstances analysis, examines the
The last section focused on driv- "totality of the circumstances' which
ers who, despite "implied consent; would include, in this context, the
actually refuse to submit to a blood characteristics of the individual drivtest when stopped by police for DUI. er and other circumstances of the
Many drivers in this situation, how- traffic stop. In McNeely, the Court reever, will actually consent to a blood fused to rule that the metabolization
test, to avoid the $250 fine and one- of alcohol, per se, establishes exigent
year suspension of their license. It circumstances, because the per se apis unsettled whether states can con- proach conflicted with the totality of
stitutionally use such administra- circumstances analysis used to anative penalties to encourage people lyze exigent circumstances. Likewise,
to consent. Justice Sotomayor sug- the Court will probably refuse to
gested in McNeely that such admin- rule as a categorical matter that the
istrative schemes are constitutional, prospect of administrative penalties
a suggestion to which three other will never make a driver's consent
Justices subscribed. This author pre- to a blood search involuntary; such
dicts that a majority of the Court a categorical ruling conflicts with
would agree, on one of two grounds. the totality of circumstances analyFirst, the Court might conclude sis used to analyze voluntariness. In
that consent to a blood test can be sum, the Court cannot easily use its
voluntary even if given to avoid ad- case law on consent searches to give
ministrative penalties. The prospect a blanket blessing to the administraof penalties arguably exerts less pres- tive penalty schemes in implied consure than circumstances that, the sent laws.
Court has found, did not render
A more promising approach uses
23
consent to a search involuntary.
Fourth Amendment reasonableness

,7 z__
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analysis to uphold these administrative penalty schemes. The Court has
said that "the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental
search is 'reasonableness'" and that
"where there was no clear practice,
either approving or disapproving
the type of search at issue, at the
time [the Fourth Amendment] was
enacted, whether a particular search
meets the reasonableness standard is
judged by balancing its instruction
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests' 2 4 Furthermore, a leading treatise endorses reasonableness analysis for blood tests of drivers under
implied consent laws. 2 Finally, two
of the Court's cases support using a
reasonableness analysis.
In those cases, the Court used a
reasonableness analysis to uphold
warrantless searches of probationers
and parolees. In each case, the subject
of the search "consented" to them as
a condition of probation or parole.
But the Court expressly refused to
rely on consent, and relied instead
on a reasonableness analysis. 26 The
Court might have eschewed the consent rationale so it could issue decisions generally upholding searches
of probationers and parolees.
Strong arguments support the
reasonableness of administrative
penalties encouraging drivers suspected of DUI to submit to blood
tests. The state has a huge interest in
The Advocate -January 2014
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taking impaired drivers off the roads.
True, drivers have a weighty interest
in avoiding the bodily intrusion of
blood testing. But the intrusion is
mitigated by the information that
officers must give drivers before testing. It could be further mitigated by
state efforts to give drivers actual,
advance notice - when issuing drivers' licenses, for example - of the
implied consent law.

Conclusion
U.S. Supreme Court case law
sidetracks Idaho's implied consent
law but does not run it entirely off
the road. Exigent circumstances will
often justify warrantless blood draws
from drivers suspected of DUI. Alternatively, many drivers will submit
to warrantless blood draws to avoid
administrative penalties that the U.S.
Supreme Court would likely uphold
as reasonable, especially if Idaho
strives to give Idaho drivers actual
notice of the implied consent law.
But if exigent circumstances don't
exist and the driver refuses to submit, a warrantless, forced blood draw
violates the Fourth Amendment.
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